French investigators: Air France 447 pilots didn't fully grasp situation

This accident, along with that of the Colgon Air crash at Buffalo, NY, emphasize the need for stall recognition and proper recovery in all phases of flight. Most autopilots will disconnect when a stall warning occurs. This happened in both accidents, and in both cases, the flight crews were not able to interpret what happened and react properly.

Despite so much publicity given to the Buffalo air crash, it seems nothing was digested with regard to penny pinching during training. It seems absurd to suggest that the pilots were not trained to hand fly at high altitude on attitude, that is only minus the airspeed reading. You can bring in more gimmicks, but in my opinion more time on the aircraft is needed in manouvering in training and opportunity provided during line operations such as climbing to cruise altitude. A stall could not be recognised when presented by unusual circumstances.
Air France cannot blame the pilots only for this mishap since this goes right to the top. It is a failure where the tip is only visible in the form of poorly trained crew.

Airbus and its crew crew need to know how to fly -- the old fashioned way. Manuel.  Forget computers saving you.  Back to the basics. And on Airbus that's pretty scary -- the video-game plane....

The weather that night was terrible as well. They had no business whatsoever flying through those towering storm systems.  So whoever dispatched that flight made a mistake as well.

As with most major disasters it isn't one thing going wrong it's several things going wrong compounding.  "Improbable," well it happened folks.  Silly face-saving language.  

AF 447 explanation from A330 Pilot

Most logical explanation I've heard to date .... and maybe now they'll consider going back to a system pilots can fly when all ...breaks loose ...

Letter of the Week: Airbuses Fly "Like a Video Game"

I would like to offer my comments and perspective with regard to the Air France Flight 447 accident. I have been a A-330 captain since 2003 and have over 4500 hours in the aircraft. While many A-320 pilots undoubtedly have more series time, I believe this probably makes me one of the most experienced A330 pilots in the world.

When asked how I like the aircraft, I tell people that there is likely no easier airplane to take over an ocean, and that the systems design and presentation is superb. That said, the automation is more complex and less intuitive than necessary, and the pilot-aircraft interface is unlike that of a conventional aircraft. Most important with regard to this accident is the fly-by-wire sidestick control. The sidestick itself has a very limited range of motion, making inadvertent over-control very easy. Of even greater significance, the stick itself provides no "feel" feedback to the pilot. That is, unlike a conventional aircraft, the pilot does not get a sense through pressure of how much input is being sent to the control surfaces. The most important advice I give to pilots new to the Airbus is to treat the aircraft not as an airplane, but as a video game. If you wait for the sidestick to tell you what you are doing, you will never get an answer.

Taking into consideration that Air France 447 was at FL 350 (where the safe speed envelope is relatively narrow), that they were in the weather at night with no visible horizon, and that they were likely experiencing at least moderate turbulence, it does not surprise me in the least that the pilots lost control of the aircraft shortly after the autopilot and autothrust disconnected.

Let's keep in mind that these are not ideal conditions for maintaining controlled flight manually, especially when faced with a sudden onslaught of warning messages, loss of autofllght, confusing airspeed indications, and reversion to "alternate law" flight control, in which certain flight envelope protections are lost.

A very bad Airbus design feature is thrust levers that do not move while in autothrust. They are instead set in a detent which would equal climb thrust in manual mode. If the pilots did not reset the thrust levers to equal the last cruise power setting, they likely eventually ended up in climb power, making it difficult to reset the proper cruise power setting and adding to what was likely already a great deal of confusion.

But the real problem probably occurred immediately after the pilot flying grabbed the sidestick and took over manually. Unfortunately, airline pilots rarely practice hand-flying at high altitude, and almost never do so without autothrust engaged. As a result, we forget that the aircraft is very sensitive to control inputs at high altitude, and overcontrol is the usual result. Because the Airbus sidestick provides no feedback "feel" to the pilot, this problem is dramatically compounded in this aircraft.

I believe the Air France pilot grabbed the sidestick, made an immediate input (because as pilots, that's what we tend to do), and quickly became quite confused as to what the aircraft was truly doing. This confusion likely was exacerbated by fixating on airspeed indications that made no sense while trying to find a power setting with no airspeed guidance.

When transitioning from autopilot to manual control at altitude in the Airbus, the most important thing to do at first is nothing. Don't move a thing, and then when you do, gently take hold of the sidestick and make very small inputs, concentrating on the flight director (which, in altitude hold, should still have been providing good guidance). Of course, this is much easier said than done with bells and whistles going off all over the place, moderate turbulence and a bunch of thunderstorms in the area. As I said before, treat it like a video game.

So why did the Air France pilot find himself at the limits of sidestick travel, and then just stay there, maintaining a control input that simply could not logically be correct? When things go really bad and we are under intense pressure, it is human nature to revert to what we know from previous experience. Remember, the Airbus flies like no other aircraft in that the sidestick provides no feedback to the pilot. It is a video game, not an airplane.

I believe the Air France pilot unintentionally fell back on all of his previous flying experience, in which aircraft controls "talked" to him when he moved them. Distracted by many confusing inputs, he instinctively expected to be able to control the aircraft by "feel" while dividing his attention to address other matters. I've seen it happen in the simulator, and in an Airbus this is a sure way to lose control of the aircraft and is possibly the most dangerous aspect of Airbus design philosophy.

One last note: Airbus pilots often claim that the aircraft "cannot be stalled." When the flight controls are in "normal law" this is a reasonably true statement. However, in "alternate law," as was the case here, stall protection can be lost. If we ever practiced this in the simulator, I don't remember it.

Lest anyone think I am blaming the Air France pilots for this accident, let me be clear. Despite all of my experience in the aircraft, I am not the least bit certain that I would have been able to maintain control under the same circumstances. I do feel certain that were you to spring this scenario on pilots in a simulator without warning less than half of them would have a successful outcome. Safely flying the 320, 330 and 340-series Airbus requires something of a non-pilot mindset.

Pilotos continue to be others scape goat!
Who is responsible for the lack of CRM and stall training?
Who is responsible for the vulnerabilities of the new technologies and pilotos lack of understanding of the entire picture when something goes wrong?
It seems that aplying publish procedures are not always enough! etc

The training needs to focus not on approach to stalls but recovery from a fully developed deep stall. Power alone will not always work. There was a DC-8 cargo aircraft accicdent may years ago involving a test flight that is very much the same. In that accicdent the crew was composed of check airman/mangement pilots creating a simular situation as to who was in charge.

Ordinary Joe, the tailplane detached when the plane hit the water. That was previously disclosed and confirmed by the investigators. Don't try to confuse the real issue by bringing up settled facts. We don't know why the pilots didn't fly it right but they didn't. Let's learn from this so we don't make it again!

I am not a pilot so I really appreciated reading what you had to say. But I have a question based on my own personal theory of the crash.

10 years ago an American Airlines A300's tail (rudder) broke off due to an over stress limit situation after take off from JFK.

So my question is could that have happened to this A330 in severe turbulence? Where was the tail found in relationship to where was the rest of the wreckage found? If they were many miles apart that could have been the reason. The airplane didn't stall. It just fell out of the sky.

"Failed to properly identify a stall" ?????? And the stall warning alarm was blaring for 54 seconds???? It's easy to blame the pilots when they are not around to defend themselves. I'd continue to look more closely at the design of the A330...

Very well stated.

Thank you for taking the time to enlighten all of us about this situation. I was about to assign blame on the pilots but all I know now, is I am a little bit more afraid of flying. Stay blessed and happy flying.

Pilot wannabe, too old to become one.

The air speed indicators came back to normal readings within a minute of the initial pitot problem. They gave good readings for atleast another 2minutes before the plane hit the water. Why didn't the pilots reengage autopilot? Surely engaging the autopilot would have atleast taken them out of the stall?

Failed to properly identify a stall????-this is not an issue of how the Airbus is designed. Who remembers the Turkish charter company 757 that crashed into the sea at night with a very experienced Capt at the controls. In this case the pitot tubes had been blocked by a wasp that built its nest in the Capts pitot tubes leading to unreliable airspeed. In all aircraft types from a Piper to a Jumbo a blocked pitot tube will give an erroneous reading on the associated ASI. Increase the altitude and the airspeed appears to increase when in fact for the same power setting it is in fact decreasing towards the stall speed. Train the pilots-no matter what the type- to recognise and recover from these scenarios. My company has.

Excellent and very credible since it comes from a pilot. Your comments should be sent to John Leahy from Airbus ...

In this day and age, it is sad that planes are still dropping out of the sky like rocks.

The stabilizer flew, the wing stalled, otherwise it would not have flown to impact with a Ground Speed of 107 kts. If the horizontal stabilizer had migrated, it would have had a Ground Speed of ZERO, with a Vertical Speed of probably 20000 fpm, academic over 750fpm, as this discourse is. In nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti. The pope of the Church of Rome, Joe Ratzinger, alias Benny the umpteenth-April 2005, could not have made up this AF 447 ascending and descending trajectory.
AF-447 stands in LOC/URT-Loss Of Control/Upset Recovery Training, stark contrast to Alaska Airlines Flight 261-MD-80 of Jan 31 2000 and it’s Captain Ted Thompson.Ted, was the exception to the media rule of devalued HEROISM OF CHOICE instead of NO CHOICE PROFESSIONALISM. His exception, thus making the rule, was his utter heroic calm stoicism and abyss-facing resignation of outcome having lost his valiant struggle with his FO, the PF, Bill Tansky. For me, the late-great Capt Ted and Bill are heroes in the same way the late Dermot Morgan’s Fr. Ted, of Ireland was the also a late lamented hero of Catholic Taliban comedic heroism. Heroism is today devalued to the point of social media hyperinflation. Heroism is choice, Fr. Ted had some, Capt.Ted had none, like Sully of the Hudson too. Ted and Sully are made from the same right stuff, though. In my view, their “choice heroism” was their resolute calm. They are truly rare gems in a contemporary rolling media Sludge Tsunami of Twatter-like narcissism. Though non-recoverable due to a Grade Z, D-Check base maintenance deficit, thread bare stab trim jackscrew , Alsaka Airlines Flight 261’s CRM stoic efforts qualify for a URTtemperament type rating alone. Clearly,from his last valiant efforts of control of a situation, unforeseen and beyond control, let alone training, one can only marvel with saluted admiration at Ted’s resolute calm and hope that if faced with a mirror image, one would not be found blushingly wanting. No better epitaph can any pilot deceased on duty attain, than Ted and Bill’s CVR. And Ted’s last CVR words intersecting the Pacific Ocean at nearly 90 degrees, with the normal side view, filling the front view, were a resolved and resigned “Here we go !”
The AF-447 transcript has one mitigating non-CRM non-comment at least, that most will appreciate. That is, no Gods were invoked, QED-RIP. To pray tactically then, would be to hope strategically for the laws of physics of the known universe to be suspended upon the prayers of an individual penitent, confessedly unworthy. AF-447’s crew were at least more worthy than that lamentable last refuge of the scoundrel.
In this regard, AF-447 stands in stark contrast to Egyptair 990's B-767-300 off Nantucket and it’s (scheduled)CRZ FO, Gameel Al-Batouti, the God-invoking penitent of October 31 1999. Jet-Lagged God was provoked then, in vain, as usual.
English Translated Transcript AF 447, June 1 2009 (PIC: Captain, PF: Pilot Flying, PNF: Pilot Non-Flying /Monitoring):
Time Source
02:00:33 PF Well a bit of turbulence which you just saw… we will … we should find it again before, in fact we are in the cloud layer unfortunately as we can not climb too much for the moment because of the temperatue which is sinking less than expected. This is reducing the REC MAX for us a little lower to go for 37 (FL370)
02:06:44 PF The ITC, there it is between SALPU and TASIL
02:06:54 PF Minus 42, we are not going to use the anti ice, it is still there
02:07 :00 PF You see we are really on the limit of the cloud layer
02:08:07 PNF Can you maybe turn a bit to the left? I agree that we are in manual, right?
02:08:19 PNF What I call manual means we are not in managed mode (Nav)
02:09:54 PNF Here, I’ll reduce the speed a bit for you
02:10:03 PF Do you want to switch to Ignition Start?
02:10:06 PF I have control !
02:10:09 PF Ignition Start !
02:10:11 PNF What is this?
02:10:14 PF We don’t have a good… We don’t have a good indication of ….
02:10:17 PNF We have lost the speeds, engine thrust A THR engine lever thrust
02:10:18 PF … speed
02:10:22 PNF Alternate Law Protections
02:10:24 PNF Wait, we are about to loose
02:10:25 PNF Wing Anti-Ice
02:10:27 PNF Watch your speed, Watch your speed !
PF Ok, ok, I will descend back
PNF You are stabilizing
PF Yeah !
PNF You are descending back
02:10:33 PNF According to the three you are climbing, now you are descending
02:10:35 PF Agreed
02:10:36 PNF You are at… descend back
PF It is going, we are descending back
02:10:39 PNF I’ll put you on A T T (*) (Selecteur ATT /HDG is put in position F/O on 3)
02:10:42 PF We are, yes we are in climb
02:10:49 PNF Where is he, eh?
02:10:56 PF TOGA
02:11:00 PNF Try to use the lateral controls as few as possible, hey!
02:11:03 PF I am in TOGA
02:11:06 PNF Is he coming or not ?
02:11:21 PNF We have certainly the engines, what is happening?
02:11:32 PF I don’t have control of the aircraft, I don’t have control of the aircraft at all !
02:11:38 PNF Command to the left (taking control)
02:11:41 PF I have the impression that we have speed…. (we are in speed)
02:11:43 PIC Hey, what are you doing?
PNF What is happening, I don’t know, I don’t know what is happening
02:11:53 PIC Ok, take, take this…
02:11:58 PF Have a problem, I have no more vertical speed here
PIC Agreed
PF I have no indication at all.
02:12:04 PF I have the impression that we have a crazy speed, no, what do you think?
[Speedbrakes are deployed]
02:12:07 PNF NO!, don’t extend them! Certainly not !
02:12:13 PNF What do you think, what do you think, what do we have to do?
02:12:15 PIC I don’t know, it descends
02:12:20 PF Here, that is good, we have wings level, no it doesn’t want
PIC Wings to level, the horizon, the backup horizon
PNF The horizon (secondary)
02:12:26 PNF The speed?
02:12:27 PNF You are climbing,
VS Stall Stall
PNF You are descending, descending, descending !
02:12:30 PF I am descending?
PNF Descend!
02:12:32 PIC No, you are climbing
02:12:33 PF Here, I am climbing, okay, right so lets descend (or okay we are descending) (unclear)
02:12:42 PF OK, we are in TOGA
02:12:42 PF On the altitude, where are we?
02:12:44 PIC This is not possible!
02:12:45 PF On alti(tude) we are where?
02:12:45 PNF What do you mean on altitude?
PF Yes, yes, yes, I am descending there, no?
PNF Yes, you are descending
PIC Hey, you are in…. put the wings level,
PNF Put the wings level!
PF That is what I am trying to do!
PIC Put the wings level!
02:12:59 PF I am at the limit of, with the warping
PIC The rudder!
02:13:25 PF What, how is it that we are continuing to descend at the limit there?
02:13:28 PNF Try to find what you can do with the controls up there, The primaries e.t.c.
02:13:32 PF At level 100
02:13:36 PF 9000 ft
02:13:38 PIC Carefull with the rudder!
02:13:39 PNF Climb, climb. Climb, climb !
02:13:40 PF But I am at the limit of the nose since a while
PIC No, no, no, don’t climb!
PNF So descend!
02:13:45 PNF So, give me the controls, to me the controls!
PF Go ahead, you have the controls, we are still on TOGA
02:14:05 PIC Careful, you are nose high (cabres? )
PNF I am nose high?
PF Well, we need to, we are at 4000 ft
02:14:18 PIC Go, Pull !
PF Go, Pull, pull, pull !
02:14:26 PIC Ten degrees pitch !

Editorial note: at 02:12:04Z the transcript mentions the speedbrakes have been deployed, the FDR graphics as well as the remainder of the report do not mention at all whether the speedbrakes have been extended or not.

Indeed Mike. On the official French transcript of , August 2, and English transcript of August 3 the speedbrake deployment is confirmed. Quoting David Learmount of Flight Global, “When the impact came, the sidestick on the left side had a nose-down and right-roll input, the right hand sidestick was on the nose-up stop with neutral roll input”. Conclusion ?, while the non-crew individual pilots were indecisive throughout the surreal descent, at impact they were not so sure.
Who really has any need to waste brain wattage on fiction ? With CVR transcripts like this, fiction will always be rendered redundant, this script could not be made up..
2 h 12 min 04- 2 h 12 min 07
Les aérofreins sont commandés et
déployés.
(The PF on the right hand seat had to reach across the central pedestal with his left hand to extend the « aerofreins » or airbrakes/speedbrakes/spoilers to the now left hand seat PNF-PF. Thereby adding another few thousand FPM to the negative VS balance sheet, momentarily. At least the now PF of then in the left hand seat had some idea of not adding additional water on the sauna coals adding to an already unbearable sweat of incomprehension ruining a now grubby white collar.)
J’ai l’impression qu’on
a une vitesse de fou
non qu’est-ce que vous
en pensez ? -In English= “I have the impression that we have a crazy speed, no, what do you think?”
2 h 12 min 07
29736ft
L’incidence 2 est temporairement
valide à 41°.
L’alarme ‘Stall warning’ est activée.
Non surtout ne ne (les)
sors pas –In English= “NO!, don’t extend them! Certainly not !”
VS : « Stall, stall »
White collars seek refuge in complication to the extent of confusing themselves into oblivion. Blue collars are less sophisticated and more simple folk. The blue collar recovery muscle memory recovery method would be thus : Push, Power, Rudder, Roll. Push to unload the wings and reestablish airflow,(ignore the screaming slipstream). Power to aft to reduce speed or forward to preserve it, (whatever feels right, no absolute values). Rudder towards the sky or blue PFD and hold it. Only when the wings are flying with a moderate, below 30 degrees bank angle invite the ailerons to bite the air and roll towards an even keel. Only when or to reestablish be complicated. Pulling oneself in the nocturnal and intellectual dark, does not bode well for a healthy outcome in general and an aircraft in particular.
The captain entered the pitched up and rolling bridge at 02:11:43 @ FL355 and 3.5mins to oceanic impact. That is by any sweated pulsating metric an emergency lifetime window of opportunity of altitude insurance. Opportunity comes to pass, certainly not pause. He could have forcefully ejected the left seat PNF-PF-PNF by the white and moistened collar PDQ and possibly recovered by FL100. Not exactly standard CRM, but more John Wayne tactical improvisation in desperation, we’ll talk about it over a long desk. After all, he was PIC and very sadly exhibited command of less Napoleon Bonaparte’s mantra of “ Nothing is more difficult, and therefore more precious, than to be able to decide”, and more Jacques Clouseau,-without a clue. For once, I’m not laughing. Command can be delegated, responsibility can be shared but ultimately what is tactically shared devolves to strategic responsibility to a single commander, be they TO/LDG commanders or CRZ commanders.
Bon Chance avec Air France fired the opening volley beyond parody on Friday July 29 2011, which basically praised the crew for their stoic battle to the end (omitting the fact that a crew member started the chain from a technically induced,(AP disengage) manual flight zoom climb to stall-FACT)
AF July 29 2011 :"It should be noted that the misleading stopping and starting of the stall warning alarm, contradicting the actual state of the aircraft, greatly contributed to the crew’s difficulty in analyzing the situation. During this time, the crew, comprising both First Officers and the Captain, showed an unfailing professional attitude, remaining committed to their task to the very end. Air France pays tribute to the courage and determination they showed in such extreme conditions. At this stage, there is no reason to question the crew’s technical skills."
And despite the total lack of basic CRM, let alone basic stick and rudder skills, this is some chutzpah from Bon Chance avec Air France, in all fairness. All uncovered, let’s not forget in the media storm, thanks to a French Thales Pitot Tube with a dodgy heating element with pre and post history, now ironically reverting back to the original US Goodrich with Thales in corporate disgrace. Thales was a French industrial champion and it was unseemly to have Henri Pitot’s tube, Henri radius of action was - le 29 Mai 1695 et mort à Aramon le 27 Décembre 1771. Henri and not Goodrich was appropriate for Air France. probe on a nominal European “grand projet”, being Airbus. And the French think US irony is a piece of metal ? Bravo and Kudos to Thales for your unintentional contribution to commercial jet aviation’s greatest learning experience since the Comet era, bar none.
Airbus and Bon Chance avec Air France will vehemently defend themselves against the indefensible, to defend their vested interests, which are fairly simple, as most vested interests are.
For Airbus they are, from my interpretation of Airbus Control Law : “We build a range of FBW types from the A-318-A-380 with identical handling characteristics, making them same movie different cinema as far as the pilot operators are concerned. They have their common, possibly misleading, micro-quirks of Auto when in Manual and Manual when in Auto and hyper sensitivity in Alternate Law at altitude from Normal Law, with an intellectual white collar approach to stalling. That was the simpler macro approach when designing a broad macro-market product base. That is, with X-AOA and Y -IAS, the warning is Z invalid, though the stalled wing is still stalled in it’s ambient real world. Boeing chooses to keep the stick shaking clatter continuous. At Airbus we choose the lesser perturbation of the “elan (petit cricket) sound” to avoid too much white collar sweating, as this spoils uniforms in a white collar CRM environment and a stick shaker is too blue collar, base maintenance D-Check, for our elan taste in an evolved IT world, voilla- évidemment ! The unintellectual Boeing (B-744) MAWEA-Modular Avionics Warning Electronic Assembly, only looks at a wing-like vane on the nose, like Airbus too, but that is all it looks at. We regard stalling as a more intellectual to approach and less physical to depart, without departing. So beware of these less intellectual Boeing pilots converting to Airbus, particularly if actually stalled don’t pitch aft in Normal Law, Alpha Floor –Throttle Up, AOA protected expectation bias, as in the biannual Le Bourget Airshow, impressive though that display is. And the Alpha-Floor stick pitch aft, thrust lever static thrust forward in Normal Law can lead to a false sense of security in Alternate Law of Normal Law approach to stall recovery expectation bias, as pulling-pitching aft provokes Alpha Floor to , as in Shuttle Speak, après Max-Q, to “Go at throttle-up !”.
For Air France they are, from my interpretation of Air France Commercial Law : “We accepted Airbus in our fleet, as they guarantee resale prices irrespective of ambient market conditions, unlike Milton Freidman Boeing, which does not have an Airbus crystal ball of prediction. Airbus, like us, has always been more John Maynard Keynes political and less economical, though as he said, "in the long run, we are all dead”. Though perhaps, in reflection from AF-447 we should have been more “Caveat emptor” in our buyer-aware Airbus purchase decisions. But this was only one accident, in fairness. On June 3 and June 22 1962 we lost 2 B-707s, F-BHSM & F-BHST respectively, killing an aggregate total of 243 people. So in that context 228 fatalities on 1 A-332, F-GZCP, though individually tragic, of June 1 2009, is not so bad in aggregate historical context of being 15 up in 47 years on a Boeing-Airbus balance of equilibrium. Voilla !”
And before being accused of being pro-US Boeing and anti-EU-Airbus, 50+% of the $ content of any Airbus is US, by default, pardon the congressional/Eurozone pun. Boeing simply equates with my simple intellect. The non-US world aviation series has voted accordingly, generally tilted in Boeing’s favour. My mind is still opened, like a parachute, as best used, Voilla !, I hope.

As an English person living in France it is first entirely predictable that AirFrance will deny all responsibility. That is the standard French response to any failure. They NEVER admit liability.
We just had a gate fixing pull out of a pillar after only 8 months and the installers tried to (a) blame us for having poor quality stone in the pillar and (b) stated that because of the recent high winds the failure was not their fault. It was an Act of God.
This is the standard response in France to any mistake or failure. In a supermarket you never get an apology if you take back faulty goods.
The non-co-operation of the French pilot's union is equally predictable. They are only interested in protecting their members.
However, returning to the specifics of the AirFrance accident, I wonder whether the plane could have been diverted around the worst of the storm? I have often been on flights from the Far East to Europe and (with Lufthansa) we often made quite big diversions to avoid storms over India. Do AirFrance do this, or do they prefer their pilots to go through the centre to save on fuel, or are pilots too macho (a common problem with pilots in the past), or was the storm over so large an area that there was no way they could have avoided the worst of it?
My second comment is that as eight year old kid interested in science I knew that in the event of a plane approaching a stall the stick has to go forward and you keep up the air-speed.
I still cannot see how two pilots could just ignore the words STALL-STALL, unless they thought that was also a false message coupled to the failure of the air-speed indicator, but they did not even discuss whether the message should be ignored, which seems just crazy.
I know the AirFrance pilots did not have air speed indication, but surely they must have some idea that a certain position on the throttle equates roughly to a certain airspeed in level flight?
Did the pilots have an altimeter reading, so that they should have been able to see what was happening to the plane, or was that lost at the same time as air-speed indication? Having (once) flown a simple prop plane I could always see the altimeter numbers counting up or down as a check whether I was in level flight, in addition to my visual horizon. Did the AirFrance pilots not have this display?
Can a pilot please enlighten me.

Still would like to know, did the passengers know what was happening!!!!