New Program, Old Problems

AS BOEING STRUGGLES TO GET THE LATEST version of the 747 to first flight, there is more than a touch of deja vu to the situation, recalling as it does events in Seattle 40 years ago this past February when the first 747 took to the air. Across a span of four decades, the company confronts similar issues on the 747-8, as strained
engineering resources and delays dog the program again.

In the late 1960s, Boeing's resources were stretched to the absolute limit as its engineers grappled with the complexities of its 2707 supersonic transport, which eventually was scrapped by Congress on May 20, 1971, despite commitments for 115 from 25 airlines. At the time, the 747 was considered only an interim solution, an aircraft for economy class while well-heeled travelers went supersonic. The manufacturer had assigned most of its top engineering talent to the SST project.

"I was the only qualified person available [for the 747]," Boeing legend Joe Sutter recalled to ATW many years later. "Maynard Pennell, Bill Cook, Bob Withington and many others were tied up on the SST while Jack Steiner was heading the 737 program." Fortunately for the company, Sutter would turn out to be more than adequate to the task at hand and fathered the classic of the jet age. It is this classic design from which Boeing is striving to wring just one last version--and in doing so to create history, as no widebody aircraft will have been in production for as long and only the 737 in the jet era beats the longevity of the 747.

But as with the 747-100 in the late 1960s, the manufacturer's efforts since launching the 747-8 have been distracted, this time by the glamorous and fast-selling 787 (for which it faces an even bigger catalog of problems). For some time after it launched the 747-8 it had not even completed a proper mockup of the interior, showing customers instead an unimpressive patchwork of partial mockups while Airbus was showing off a magnificent full-scale mockup of its competing A380. And when key customers, such as Emirates, requested solutions to cabin layout problems and range issues, Boeing's focus was elsewhere, say insiders at the company and the airline. "We dropped the ball big time," conceded one senior executive to ATW.

The manufacturer also underestimated Airbus's efforts to keep the 747-8I out of the passenger market, say some airline executives, and a number of key campaigns were lost to pricing and political pressure. Meanwhile, Boeing's inability to offer solutions quickly to Emirates' range requirements has cost it any chance of securing an order from the trendsetting carrier for the passenger version. Airbus and Boeing have traded blows over the merits and performance of the A380 and 747-8 and Boeing executives are counting down the days for the -8 to take to the air to prove their numbers.

Trippe's Numbers It was numbers--passenger numbers--that were in the mind of Pan Am founder and Chairman Juan Trippe, who had led the airline world by launching many new designs including the 707 and DC-8. He had been a champion of mass travel since 1948 when he introduced an international tourist configuration on DC-4s to San Juan.

On Dec. 22, 1965, just 12 weeks after losing the C-5A competition to Lockheed, then-Boeing Chairman William Allen and Trippe signed a letter of intent to launch the 747 program. It is impossible to find anyone who recalls if there was a definitive business plan, but traffic was booming for the industry, which had enjoyed growth of 15% a year through the early 1960s as passengers flocked to jet aircraft.

Trippe was a man on a mission. He wanted to make travel affordable for everyone and he believed that the 747 with its high-bypass engines could do just that. The aircraft was expected to cut operating costs by 30% over the 707. Regardless of the reticence of other carriers, on April 13, 1966, Pan Am ordered 25 747s at $22 million apiece.

It is hard to imagine today, with 1,524 747s sold (including 106 747-8s), that the model almost bankrupted Boeing and Pratt & Whitney and started Pan Am down its long road to extinction. Orders for the big jet only trickled in initially. Japan Airlines and Lufthansa wanted three each, British Airways six, American Airlines 10, TWA 12 and United Airlines five. These numbers were a far cry from the orders for 30-plus from major US carriers that launched the jet era.

However, sales were not the major problem. The overriding challenge was weight, tons of it. When the 747 first was envisaged in late December 1965, it was to weigh 550,000 lb. (250,000 kg.) at takeoff. When the order was signed six months later, Pan Am and Boeing agreed that the takeoff weight would not exceed 655,000 lb. (297,000 kg). Pratt & Whitney committed to supply an engine with 41,000 lb. of thrust and increase it to 44,000 lb. within three years of the first deliveries.

Unhealthy Diet

By June 1967, the 747's takeoff weight was 682,000 lb. (310,000 kg.) and climbing. Pan Am and Boeing agreed that its range would drop by 900 mi. (1,449 km.) to 5,000 mi. (8,050 km.) and the maximum altitude would drop 2,000 ft. to 33,000 ft. While the altitude change may not seem like a problem, it was a significant drawback for carriers operating the aircraft. The aim was to cruise 10% faster than other jets. The altitude reduction meant that the 747 would not be able to fly above them and thus would have to fly at a slower speed.

But Boeing's problems could not be solved that easily. The company realized that it needed to increase the weight to 710,000 lb. (322,727 kg.) and thus needed Pratt to deliver an engine at 43,500 lb. of thrust three years ahead of its guarantee. Pratt recognized that a quick way to get the extra thrust was to run the engine at higher temperatures, but that would mean it was less efficient and would burn more fuel, not to mention the additional maintenance burden with premature wear.

Rectifying the fuel consumption problem meant running at even higher temperatures. Pan Am and Pratt wanted to delay the program by at least nine months, but Boeing was worried about the initial sales success of the DC-10 and L-1011 and forced the issue.
Another vexing problem occurred in flight testing when the engines distorted. A solution was found in the form of stiffening but deliveries consequently were delayed by several months. Pratt worked on other answers to the fuel consumption problem in the meantime and finally, within about six months of the 747's entering service, fuel consumption was deemed acceptable.

Even after the first commercial flight on Jan. 22, 1970, major headaches still existed. The 747's engines were giving Pan Am significant problems and it threatened to withhold $5 million per aircraft until at least 20 modifications were made. It also considered grounding its 747 fleet. A solution eventually was found and Boeing and Pratt agreed to a penalty. But while litigation receded, the manufacturer was mired in debt from the program, owing banks $1.2 billion or around $6.3 billion in 2007 dollars.

The result was savage, with the company laying off 64,000 workers to survive. In the next three years not one order was placed for the 747 and production fell from seven a month to below two, while the DC-10 went from strength to strength.

Fast Forward

Forty years later, the prospects for the passenger version of the 747-8 have dimmed somewhat owing to the loss of key orders from Emirates, Etihad and British Airways that would have given the program significant momentum. Engineering delays because of problems associated with the 787 have taken their toll as well, as has the dramatic weakening of the global economy. Boeing has sold 78 747-8F freighters, eight 747-8BBJs and 20 747-8 Intercontinental passenger models, although only four sales were recorded in 2008, all BBJ versions.

In mid-November the company revealed significant delays to the program, with the first freighter delivery pushed back to the third quarter of 2010 from late 2009 and the first 747-8I delivery slipping to the second quarter of 2011 instead of late 2010. It said that the "remaining work on the 747-8 program is well defined," and to ensure it remained that way it reorganized its aircraft program leadership structure, with Patrick Shanahan, formerly 787 VP and GM, named VP and GM-Airplane Programs for Boeing Commercial Airplanes. The company also created a new organization called Supply Chain Management and Operations headed by Ray Conner, formerly VP-sales-Commercial Airplanes.

But a big problem is that the market conditions are anything but defined, particularly for a 747-size aircraft. Key customers ANA and Asiana Airlines have put off any decision between the A380 and 747-8, citing "market conditions." Another prospect, Cathay Pacific, has locked its order book away and is looking to defer deliveries.
Airbus is working hard on turning those customers, with significant improvements in weight in its offering.
Its engineers claim they can take up to two tonnes out of the A380 in a stepped weight-reduction program to 2012. That plus interior fit-out weight gains identified by Emirates will enable the carrier to use the aircraft from Dubai to the US West Coast, routes it had earmarked for the 747-8I.

Richard Aboulafia, VP of Washington-based Teal Group, warns that "the greatest threat to the -8I is Airbus's very aggressive A380 pricing." He adds that while the 747-8 is a good plane, discounting makes the A380 an almost irresistible draw for any airline that wants a niche fleet of large aircraft. Airbus denies it is discounting to close the market to the 747-8.

Aboulafia adds that the -8I certainly looks vulnerable and the very weak cargo market weakens the -8F business case. But if Boeing can stick with the program, he says it will have a superb cargo aircraft that is well-placed to benefit when the cargo market resumes its growth. Boeing holds orders for more than 100 747s, which translates into about four years' production at the current rate of two per month. The success of the -8F was instrumental in forcing Airbus to postpone its A380F.

Aboulafia also says that with tougher times, the 747-8's lower seat-mile or freight ton costs will help the Boeing jumbo. Clearly the 747-8F is a significant advancement over the -400F. It is 18.3 ft. (5.6 m.) longer with a maximum structural payload capability of 154 tons (140 tonnes) and a range of more than 4,420 nm. (8,185 km.). The company says it will offer 16% more revenue cargo volume than the -400F and its GEnx engines will enable it to be 17% more fuel efficient and 30% quieter.

Cathay Pacific ordered 10 747-8Fs in 2007, along with six 747-400ERFs, to replace its 19 747 freighters, a combination of -200Fs, -400Fs and -400BCFs. At the time, CEO Tony Tyler said, "We are very excited about the 747-8 freighter, which provides the highest payload of any commercial freighter. More importantly, this is a highly fuel-efficient aircraft which consumes 22% less fuel per revenue payload tonne than a 747-200F and 12% less than a 747-400F."

Passenger Problems

While the business case for the 747-8F appears to be solid, the development and definition of the -8I has been somewhat shaky. Boeing initially went for range over capacity, but launch customer Lufthansa wanted additional capacity so the manufacturer turned its back on airlines like Emirates that wanted more range by stretching the passenger version the full 18.3 ft. (5.6 m.). The stretch gives the -8I a range of approximately 8,000 nm. (14,815 km.) while EK had sought a 3.6-m. stretch with a range of 8,300-8,400 nm. The -8I will seat 467 in a three-class configuration and provide nearly equivalent trip costs to the -400 and 10% lower seat-mile costs, plus 28% greater cargo volume, Boeing says.

The company and EK worked through 2008 trying to reduce the weight of the aircraft so that the airline could operate Dubai-Los Angeles with 400 passengers (a 50-ton payload) year round. "We need another 500 miles and we are not there yet," EK President Tim Clark told ATW in September 2008.
However, it was not just range that was a problem for the Dubai-based carrier and others. The A380 had ushered in larger first class suites and even double beds, which would not fit into what had been one of the 747's most attractive features: The first class zone in the nose. Again, EK laments that Boeing was slow to respond to this new challenge, something the manufacturer's executives concede.
Options included using the upper deck, but to segregate the first class passengers it would have been necessary to move the staircase to the front of the upper deck and thus direct access through Door 1.

Other suggestions to "sex up" the -8I, such as reverting back to a United Airlines suggestion from 1967 to have cockpit-style windows in the main deck nose section, were given the thumbs down. The problem again was that the -8I was not always the main game; understandably, the 787 and 777 commanded all the sales, marketing and engineering attention.

Today, the 747-8's future lies in its first flight, when hard numbers can prove its economic and environmental credentials. When it does fly, the global economy just may be showing signs of recovery and the -8 may surprise the skeptics and give the legendary airframe one final lease on life. After all, no one expected much from the first version. "It was universally assumed that the 747 would be an interim subsonic jetliner until the SSTs took over the intercontinental routes," Sutter remembers. "That's what Boeing's marketing people thought; they estimated we'd probably sell 50 or so 747s for passenger use." He gets the final word on the new one: "We [Boeing] are going to sell over 300 747-8s."